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In the paradigm case on reporter's privilege in the context of
grand jury testimony, Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
presciently stated its concern that "[allmost any author may quite
accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to
the public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and
that these sources will be silenced if he is forced to make disclosures
before a grand jury."1 In the majority opinion, Justice White also
declared that:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an
uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege
would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later,
it would be necessary to define those categories of [reporters] who qualified for the
privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a
mimeograph just as much as of the
large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the
2
latest photocomposition methods.

The time has come to define the categories of reporters who qualify for
the privilege and to determine whether it also protects
the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical 'blogger' sitting in his pajamas at his
personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his best product to inform
whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not? How could one draw a
distinction consistent with the court's vision of a broadly granted personal right?3

These concerns regarding expanding the reporter's privilege
beyond traditional, unequivocal journalism have come to bear on the
topic of blogging. This has been prompted in part by Apple Computer,
Inc.'s pending action for trade secret misappropriation against some of
its own, as yet unnamed, employees who allegedly leaked trade secrets
to non-party bloggers Jason O'Grady, Monish Bhatia, and Kasper

1.
2.
3.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972).
Id. at 703-04.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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Jade. 4 The Superior Court of Santa Clara County recently ruled that
Apple was entitled to seek discovery in the form of:
[S]ubpoenas to Powerpage.com, Appleinsider.com, and Thinksecret.com requiring
each to produce all documents relating to any information posted on its site
relating to an unreleased Apple product code named 'Asteroid' . . . and to serve
subpoenas on each of the Apple News Sites for information leading to the identity
of any individual or individuals who have5 knowledge regarding the posts on its site
disclosing information about the Product.

Additionally, "Apple obtained an order authorizing subpoenas to
[Nfox.com, Inc., PowerPage's email service provider,] and its principal,
Karl Kraft. '' 6 The bloggers subsequently sought a protective order
from the court to prevent Apple from obtaining the information citing
federal and state reporter's privilege. 7 The order was denied, and the
bloggers' appeal to the Sixth District California Court of Appeal is
8
pending.
The sequence of events prompting Apple's suit against its own
employees began when O'Grady posted an article on his site,
Powerpage.com, "discussing a rumored new product from Apple called
'Asteroid"' on November 19, 2004, along with follow-up articles on
November 22 and 23. 9 These articles stated "that Apple was
developing an add-on device that would let musicians plug their
electric guitars and other instruments into a Macintosh computer ....
The articles included two artist's renderings of the rumored device."10
O'Grady also posted an article on November 26 written under the
pseudonym of Dr. Teeth and the Electric Mayhem that "summarized
some additional details about the device from an article on
createdigitalmusic.com
and
discussed
the
various
artists'
renderings."11 A few days later, on December 7, Apple requested that
these articles be removed from the site, and O'Grady complied. 12
During the same time period, AppleInsider.com posted an article
written by Jade "entitled 'Apple developing FireWire audio interface
for GarageBand,' " which cited anonymous sources in discussing
Asteroid and an artist's rendering of the product.1 3 Bhatia is involved
4.
Brief for Petitioners at 1, O'Gradu v. Superior Court of the State of California,
No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 770069 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2005).
5.
Id. at 11 (internal quotations omitted).
6.
Id. at 12.
7.
See id. at 13.
8.
See id.
9.
Id. at 9.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
12.
Id. at 10.
13.
Id.
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in Apple's pending discovery as the publisher of the Mac News
Network on www.macnn.com. 14 She also provides hosting service to
several websites, including AppleInsider.com, which posted Jade's

article. 15
Numerous questions and concerns are presented by the Apple
case and by the rising prominence of blogging in general. 16 What
protections are afforded to bloggers when they are relying on
confidential sources to disseminate information? What protections
should be afforded? How can a court determine when bloggers are
acting as reporters in the first place? And, what protections do
traditional reporters get in similar situations? This note will attempt
to answer these questions with the purpose of the First Amendment
(as well as the practicality and risks of extending its protections) in
mind. The next section will follow the development of the traditional
reporter's privilege under federal law, examining the Supreme Court
case Branzburg v. Hayes 17 and federal circuit court decisions,
concentrating on how the circuit courts determine who and what is
protected under the guarantees of the First Amendment. This note
will then briefly discuss state constitutional privileges and statutory
shields for reporters focusing on how states determine who is included
in the category of reporters and what materials are considered
journalistic. The analysis section will start by applying the federal
First Amendment jurisprudence and the state constitutional and
statutory privilege of New York and California to the context of
blogging; then it will focus on the purpose of the First Amendment
protections and statutory shields to examine whether blogging
furthers this purpose. Finally, the proposed solution will further focus
in on the systemic nature of free speech and press and the First
Amendment's function in our democracy to support a determination
that court inquiries into a blogger's privilege should focus on whether
the results, not the process, of the blogger's speech advances our
democracy.

14.
Id. at 7.
15.
Id.
16.
This case is complicated by the trade secrets involved in the information leak,
but it nonetheless serves as a good example for the questions that arise regarding
protection of bloggers' sources.
17.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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I. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE
A. Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court thoroughly
examined the reporter's privilege and concluded that, in the context of
grand jury testimony, reporters have no constitutionally guaranteed
special privileges of speech beyond that of ordinary citizens. 18
Specifically, the Court held that "requiring [a newspaper reporter] to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries [does not
abridge] the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 19 In that case, a reporter had personally observed the
commission of the crime that he wrote about in the Louisville Courier
Journal, which involved "two young residents of Jefferson County
[Kentucky] synthesizing hashish from marihuana [sic]. '"20 Branzburg
21
"had promised not to reveal the identity of the two hashish makers."
The Jefferson County grand jury issued a subpoena to Branzburg after
publication of his article. 22 Branzburg appeared before the grand jury,
but he refused to reveal the identity of the individuals featured in his
article, attempting to invoke the Kentucky reporter's privilege statute,
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and sections 1, 2, and 8
of the Kentucky Constitution. 23 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Kentucky Court of Appeal's' holding that the Kentucky statute
afforded a reporter "the privilege of refusing to divulge the identity of
an informant who supplied him with information, but ... the statute
18.

Id. at 682-86.

19.

Id. at 667.

20.

Id.

21.
Id. at 667-68.
22.
Id. at 668.
23.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... "); KY. CONST. §§ 1, 2, 8 (§ 1 states in relevant part:
"All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights,
among which may be reckoned: . . . Fourth: The right of freely communicating their
thoughts and opinions." § 2 states: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." § 8
states in relevant part: "Every person may freely and fully speak, write and print on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100
(West 2005) ("No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial
before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any
tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the general assembly, or any committee thereof,
or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the
source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by
a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with
which he is connected.").
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did not permit a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had
observed personally, including the identities of those persons he had
24
observed."
Further, in recognizing that "the sole issue before [the Court
was] the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as
other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation
into the commission of crime,"25 the Court noted that "the great weight
of authority is that [reporters] are not exempt from the normal duty of
appearing before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to a
criminal investigation." 26 Ultimately, the Court issued a narrow
holding, specific to situations concerning a reporter's testimony in
front of a grand jury. 27 In fact, the Court noted that it did not intend
to suggest "that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated." 28 However, the Court also
emphasized that "the publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws [and] no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others," 29 and that
the press is not free to publish with impunity everything and anything it desires to
publish .... A newspaper or journalist may also be punished for contempt of court
* . .[and] the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right
30
of special access to information not available to the public generally.

In other words, although the Court noted that there was some
protection afforded to reporters by the First Amendment, it did not
articulate what that protection encompassed, and did not differentiate
the reporter's freedom of speech from that of the ordinary citizen.
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, went a bit further than the
majority opinion by articulating that an:
[A]sserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these
vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the
31
tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

B. Federaland State FirstAmendment Jurisprudence:Reactions to

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Branzburg, 408 U.S at 669.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 685.
See id. at 667.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 710.
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Branzburg
1. Federal Circuit Court Decisions
Federal courts have interpreted Branzburg in various ways.
Some circuits have read Branzburg as establishing, or at least leaving
room for, a qualified reporter's privilege. 32 Other circuits have strictly
adhered to Branzburg in all claims of reporter's privilege by denying
that such a privilege exists in any situation. 33 One circuit's stance on
a reporter's privilege is unclear. 34 This note will briefly examine the
circuit court decisions that have recognized a qualified privilege in
addition to providing an overview of the states' stances on reporter's
privilege while focusing on two states, New York and California, as
examples of state jurisprudence on point.
a. Broadly Qualified Reporter's Privileges and Balancing Tests - The
First, Second, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
In In re Special Proceedings, the First Circuit considered a
reporter's privilege in the context of a television reporter who had
aired a leaked video showing public officials accepting bribes, where
the reporter had given "a pledge of confidentiality" to the source of the
leaked videotape.3 5 Appealing the district court's decision to issue a
subpoena requiring the reporter be deposed, the reporter argued that
"it violate[d] the First Amendment to hold him in civil contempt for
refusing to answer questions as to who leaked the taped material to
32.
See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
33.
See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987); Patterson v. Burge, 33 Media L. Rep. 1200 (N.D.
Ill. 2005); In re Daimler Chrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 395 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also,
Bill
Kenworthy,
Branzburg v.
Hayes
(July
12,
2005),
available at
http://www.firstamendmentcetner.org/analysis.aspx?id=15525
(discussing
status
of
reporters' privilege in the lower federal courts in the wake of Branzburg).
34.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir.
1997) ("Some courts have interpreted Branzburg as establishing a qualified news reporter's
privilege ....

Although the Ninth Circuit in Shoen cited our opinion in Cervantes for

support, we believe this question is an open one in this Circuit."); Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,
464 F.2d 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972) ("absent a positive showing of relevance or materiality, a
newsman need not divulge the identity of his confidential news informants"); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (E.D. Ark. 1996) ("where a
grand jury inquiry is not conducted in good faith, or where the inquiry does not involve a
legitimate need for law enforcement, or has only a remote and tenuous relationship to the
subject of the investigation, then the balance of interests struck by the Branzburg majority
may not be controlling' (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 401 (9th
Cir.1993)).
35.
373 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2004).

616

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 8:3:609

him."36 The First Circuit Court noted that Branzburg left open "the
prospect that in certain situations . . . First Amendment protections
might be invoked by the reporter." 37 Specifically, the court observed
that "the three leading cases in this circuit require 'heightened
sensitivity' to First Amendment concerns and invite a 'balancing' of
considerations (at least in situations distinct from Branzburg.)" 38 The
court ultimately affirmed the order of civil contempt because "there
[was] no doubt that the request to [the reporter] was for information
highly relevant to a good faith criminal investigation; and . . .that
reasonable efforts were made to obtain the information elsewhere." 39
In New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, a case involving a
subpoena of telephone records of two New York Times reporters, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York articulated the
Second Circuit's application of Branzburg by stating that it:
[H]as recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege, applicable in civil actions
and in all phases of a criminal prosecution, that protects reporters from compelled
disclosure of confidential sources. Pursuant to this qualified privilege, the party
seeking disclosure must make a 'clear and specific showing that the sought
information is: [1] highly material and relevant, [21 necessary or critical to40 the
maintenance of the claim, and [3] not obtainable from other available sources.'

The Second Circuit viewed this case as a battle between the conflicting
interests of "the free press on the one hand and the fair and full
administration of criminal justice on the other." 41 Upon balancing
"the interests of the free press and the government under these facts
and authorities," the court held that the "balance requires
maintaining the secrecy of the confidential sources of [the
reporters] .42
Similarly, in Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, the Second Circuit was
faced with deciding "whether one who gathers information initially for
a purpose other than traditional journalistic endeavors and who later
decides to author a book using such information may then invoke the
First Amendment to shield the production of the information and
manuscript." 43 Focusing on the Supreme Court's use of the term
'newsgathering,' the court noted that "a qualified privilege may be
36.
Id. at 44.
37.
Id. at 45.
38.
Id. (citing Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716-17 (1st Cir. 1998);
United States v. LaRouche, 841 F.2d at 1182-83 (1st Cir. 1988); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper, Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596-99 (1st Cir. 1980)).
39.
Id.
40.
382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
41.
Id. at 462.
42.
Id. at 513.
43.
811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987).
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proper in some circumstances because newsgathering was not without
First Amendment protection."'44 On the question articulated in Von
Bulow, the court held that "the individual claming the privilege must
demonstrate, through competent evidence, the intent to use material sought, gathered or received - to disseminate information to the public
and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering
process." 45 According to the court, this determination would require
"an intent-based factual inquiry to be made by the district court."46
Along the same line of reasoning, the Third Circuit explained
in Fox v. Township of Jackson that it has "imposed a heavy burden on
parties wishing to overcome [the reporter's privilege] and compel a
newsperson to testify in a civil matter."47 The court further stated
that in Riley v. City of Chester it had "found a federal common law
privilege for journalists to refuse . . . to testify in a civil matter,"
noting that the "privilege recognizes society's interests in protecting
the integrity of the news gathering process, and in ensuring the free
flow of information to the public." 48 The standard applied in Fox and
articulated in a previous Third Circuit case, United States v. Criden,
was that "[t]he moving party must demonstrate that: (1) he has made
an effort to obtain the information from other sources; (2) the only
access to the information is through the journalist and his sources;
and (3) the information sought is crucial to the claim." 49 The Fox court
held that this standard was not met because the information in the
article at issue in the case "was not specific enough to lead the reader
to believe the journalist possessed any relevant and unique
information" because "it was not a quotation ... nor did it rise to the
level of an admission, and there is no evidence the information sought
50
...was crucial to [the] claim" in the case.
Comparably, the Ninth Circuit's broad reporter's privilege "is a
recognition that society's interest in protecting the integrity of the
newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to
the public, is an interest of sufficient social importance to justify some
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of

44.

Id. at 142 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

45.
46.

Id. at 144.
Id.

47.

48.
Cir. 1998);
49.
Cir. 1980).
50.

64 Fed. Appx. 338, 340 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2003) (unpublished decision).

Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979).
Fox, 64 Fed. Appx. at 341; United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358-59 (3d
Id.
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justice." 51 In Farr v. Pritchess, the Ninth Circuit held "that the
journalist's privilege recognized in Branzburg was a partial First
Amendment shield that protects journalists against compelled
disclosure in all judicial proceedings, civil and criminal alike," but that
nevertheless:
[T]he privilege is qualified, not absolute, and ... the process of deciding whether
the privilege is overcome requires that the claimed First Amendment privilege and
the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding
52
facts, and a balance struck to determine where lies the paramount interest.

The Ninth Circuit also followed the Second Circuit in holding that "the
journalist's privilege is designed to protect investigative reporting,
53
regardless of the medium used to report the news to the public."
The Tenth Circuit, in examining a claim of First Amendment
privilege of a taxpayer who refused to comply with a discovery order
on behalf of the IRS, similarly stated that "although the First
Amendment does not normally restrict the actions of purely private
individuals, the amendment may be applicable in the context of
discovery orders, even if all of the litigants are private entities."54 The
court applied the balancing test set forth in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp, holding that:
[A]mong the factors that the trial court must consider are (1) the relevance of the
evidence; (2) the necessity of receiving the information sought; (3) whether the
information is available from other sources; and (4) the nature of the information.
The trial 55
court must also determine the validity of the claimed First Amendment
privilege.

In Silkwood, the court examined the following questions:
[First], whether a privilege exists in favor of a non-party witness which permits
him to resist pretrial discovery in order to protect a confidential source of
information. Secondly, whether assuming that such a privilege does exist, it
applies to a person in the position of [the freelance reporter].
Third, if [the
56
reporter] has a privilege, how should the trial court proceed.

In determining these questions, the court relied on Supreme
Court holdings, including Branzburg, in noting that the "Supreme
Court has not limited the privilege to newspaper reporting. It has in
fact held that the press comprehends different levels of publications
51.
Schoen v. Schoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 (1979) (stating that the sacrifice of
informational sources is sometimes justified, in the protection of certain interests).
52.
Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir.
1975)).
53.
Id. at 1293; Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1987).
54.
Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
55.
Id.
56.
Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1977).
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which communicate to the public information and opinion." 57
Additionally, the Supreme Court had recognized that "the First
Amendment occupies a preferred position in the Bill of Rights" and
that "any infringement of the First Amendment must be held to a
minimum - that is to be no more extensive than the necessities of the
case."58 In sum, the Tenth Circuit reads Branzburg to mean that the
press is not required to
publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request..
. . In holding that a reporter must respond to a subpoena, the Court is merely
saying that he must appear and testify. He may, however,5 9claim his privilege in
relationship to particular questions which probe his sources.

Similarly, in Zerilli v. Smith, the D.C. Circuit established its
"guidelines for balancing First Amendment interests with a litigant's
need for information when a plaintiff seeks to subpoena a non-party
journalist in the context of a civil action."60 The D.C. Circuit requires
that the information sought goes "to the heart of the matter" and not
be merely marginally relevant. 61 Second, the plaintiff must have
"exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information 62 so
that journalists are not simply a default source of information for
plaintiffs. The D.C. Circuit also specifies in Zerilli that "despite
Branzburg[,] there is a reporter's privilege in civil actions, and that in
the ordinary case the civil litigant's interest in disclosure should yield
to the journalist's privilege."'63 Thus the D.C. Circuit's qualified
privilege carries a presumption against disclosure in the civil context
that can only be outweighed by meeting the requirements of the
balancing test in Zerilli.
b. Highly Qualified Reporter's Privilege- The Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits
The Fourth Circuit recognizes that "there are First
Amendment interests in newsgathering," but also views these as

57.
Id. at 437; see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1935) (stating that the
freedom of the press is not limited to newspapers and periodicals).
58.
Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721
(1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 404 U.S. 876 (1971); In
re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
59.
Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437.
60.
Lee v. DOJ, 413 F.3d. 53, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d

705 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
61.

Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713.

62.

Id.

63.

Lee, 413 F.3d at 58 (citing Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712).
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highly qualified interests. 6 4 It has "applied Branzburg to compel
testimony from the press in a civil contempt trial, recognizing that
only when evidence of harassment is presented do we balance the
interests involved."6 5 In In re Shain, the Fourth Circuit held that:
[T]he incidental burden on the freedom of the press in the circumstances of this
case [where the Attorney General caused subpoenas to be served on the reporters
after determining that the Department of Justice was unaware of any other
sources to obtain the information it sought] does not require the invalidation of the
subpoenas issued to the reporters, and absent evidence of governmental
harassment or bad faith, the reporters have no privilege different from that of66any
other citizen not to testify about knowledge relevant to a criminal prosecution.

Thus, the Fourth Circuit allows a highly qualified privilege based on a
broader reading of Branzburg that there is no reporter's privilege in
the context of testimony at a criminal prosecution or a civil contempt
67
proceeding.
In United States v. Smith, the Fifth Circuit declined to view
Justice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg as "a mandate to construct
a broad, qualified newsreporters' privilege in criminal cases." 68
Rather, this Circuit views Justice Powell's concurrence as
emphasizing "that at a certain point, the First Amendment must
protect the press from government intrusion" such as when a "grand
jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith."69 In Smith,
the court declined to extend a privilege to non-confidential
information, as this information is not subject to the same concerns as
confidential information, such as chilling potential sources who rely on
a promise of confidentiality and violation of the rights of the
informant. 70 Additionally, in response to the argument that absent an
institutional privilege for the press, prosecutors will "annex the news
media as an investigative arm of the government," the court opined
that the "fears that nonconfidential sources will shy away from the
media because of its unholy alliance with the government are
71
speculative at best."

64.
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 194 F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1999)
(quoting In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1992)).
65.
Shain, 978 F.2d at 853 (quoting United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373
(4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting), adopted en banc, 561 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1977))
(internal quotations omitted).
66.
Shain, 978 F.2d at 852.
67.
Id. at 852-53.
68.
United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1998).
69.
Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
70.
See id. at 970.
71.
Id. (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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The "standard governing the exercise of reporter's privilege"
72
utilized by the Eleventh Circuit is borrowed from the Fifth Circuit.
This standard "provides that information may only be compelled from
a reporter claiming privilege if the party requesting the information
can show that it is highly relevant, necessary to the proper
73
presentation of the case, and [is] unavailable from other sources."
2. State Privileges
Almost all states have enacted Reporter's Shield statutes, and
all but one recognize some form of a qualified reporter's privilege.7 4 In
fact, most states provide broader protections and further-reaching
privileges than those recognized under federal law. This note will
examine the reporter's privilege jurisprudence of two states, New York
and California, which are fairly representative of state-recognized
reporter's privilege.
a. New York - Broadly Qualified Privilege for Confidential and
Nonconfidential Materials
In O'Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., the Court of Appeals
of New York held that its qualified reporter's privilege extends to both
confidential and non-confidential materials and that it "is triggered
where the material sought for disclosure ... was prepared or collected
in the course of newsgathering." 75 This case involved a subpoena for
non-confidential photographs taken by a journalist "in the course of
newsgathering activities and kept as resource material" and that were
sought as evidence in a personal injury claim. 76 Because these
photographs were non-confidential materials, New York's Shield Law,
"which provides unqualified protection to a reporter's confidential
sources and materials" did not apply, but the state constitutional
77
qualified privilege for materials obtained in confidence did apply.
72.
United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980).
73.
Caporale,806 F.2d at 1504; Miller, 621 F.2d at 726.
74.
Connecticut, Idaho, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Virginia, Vermont, Washington,
Wyoming, Texas, South Dakota, and Utah do not have Reporter's Shield Statutes. Hawaii
has no statute and recognizes no privilege. See Bill Kenworthy, State Shield Statutes and
Leading Cases (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
analysis.aspx?id=15938&SearchString-=stateshieldlaws.
75.
O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 277 (N.Y. 1988).
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 277 n.1 (emphasis in original); see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)
(Consol. 2006) ("Absolute protection for confidential news ....No professional journalist or
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The court observed that "the autonomy of the press would be
jeopardized if resort to its resource materials ... for private purposes,
were routinely permitted" and that the "practical burdens on time and
resources, as well as the consequent diversion of journalistic effort and
disruption of newsgathering activity, would be particularly inimical to
the vigor of a free press." 78
The court further noted that
"confidentiality or the lack thereof has little, if anything, to do with
the burdens on the time and resources of the press that would
inevitably result from discovery without special restrictions." 79 The
court also recognized that the "protection afforded by the guarantee of
free press and speech in the New York Constitution is often broader
than the minimum required by the First Amendment" and that the
court generally agreed with the federal circuit courts that had
recognized a federal reporter's privilege.8 0
b. California- Broadly Qualified Privilege through Immunity from
Contempt

California's Reporter's Shield Law "protects a newsperson from
being adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose either: (1)
unpublished information, or (2) the source of information, whether
published or unpublished."'8
The Supreme Court of California in
newscaster presently or having previously been employed or otherwise associated with any
. . . professional medium of communicating news or information to the public shall be
adjudged to be in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal
proceeding, or by the legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand
jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt ... for refusing or failing to
disclose any news obtained or received in the course of gathering or obtaining news for
publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast by a radio or
television transmission station or network or for public dissemination by any other
professional medium or agency which has as one of its main functions the dissemination of
news to the public ....
"); Id. § 79-h(c) (explaining the qualified protection for nonconfidential news such that no journalist or newscaster may be held in contempt for
refusing or failing to disclose any unpublished news unless "the party seeking such news
has made a clear and specific showing that the news: (i) is highly material and relevant; (ii)
is critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense or proof of an issue
material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative source").
78.
O'Neill, 523 N.E.2d at 279-81.
79.
Id. at 279-80.
80.
Id.; see N.Y.C.L.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.").
81.
Delaney v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 789 P.2d 934, 939 (Cal.
1990); see CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 2(b)-(c) ("A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person
connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,
or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or
employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative
body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the
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Delaney emphasized that this statute creates an immunity, not a
privilege.8 2 However, the court later recognized in Miller v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County that in practice the Shield Law is
absolute because "contempt is the only effective remedy against a
nonparty witness" and the law grants "such witnesses virtually
absolute protection against compelled disclosure."8 3 The Delaney court
also agreed with an article in the L.A. Times which stated that "[a]
reporter who, say, wanders into a liquor store on his way home from
work and witnesses a holdup could not invoke the shield law and
refuse to testify. Off the job, a journalist is no different from any other
84
citizen."
c. The Problem - What is Journalism,and Who is Protected by the
Reporter's Privilege?
Most federal circuits and states recognize some form of a
reporter's privilege. The question then becomes, who does it apply to,
and who should it apply to? Specifically, should courts consider
bloggers to be journalists for purposes of First Amendment and
statutory privilege, and why or why not? As blogging becomes a more
common way for individuals who are not otherwise members of the
press to share their opinions and beliefs and to report on a potentially
broad scale, courts must develop a way of thinking about the First
Amendment that is based not on traditional notions of the press, but
on the nature of speech itself, and whether it serves the purposes of
the First Amendment. This note will attempt to distinguish between
various proposed approaches to First Amendment jurisprudence and
reach a method of judicial inquiry that will be inclusive to all forms of
media, including blogging, and that will serve First Amendment
purposes and goals.

source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a

newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public. Nor shall a radio or television news reporter
or other person connected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any person
who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for news or news
commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished
information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public."); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West 2006) (California's Reporter's
Shield Law containing essentially the same language).
82.
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 939.
83.
Miller v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 986 P.2d 170, 174 (Cal. 1999).
84.
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 939 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted); Editorial,
Breaking the Shield, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1988, at Metro, pt. 2 p. 6, col. 1.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. FirstAmendment Privileges- Systemic Purposes
The basic scope and purposes of the First Amendment are

articulated in Justice Douglas's dissent in Branzburg. Justice
Douglas dissented in the result of the case because he believed that
"there is no 'compelling need' that can be shown which qualifies the
reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury,
unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime. His immunity...
is therefore quite complete."

8

5

Justice Douglas relies heavily on

Alexander Meiklejohn's article in explaining his view of the First
Amendment as protecting "governing 'powers' of the people from
abridgment by the agencies which are established as their servants..
. . In the field of our governing 'powers', the notion of 'due process' is
irrelevant" because protections of these powers should be absolute.86
Additionally, Justice Douglas declares that the First Amendment is
essential to self-governance because "self-government can exist only
insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity,
and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a
ballot is assumed to express."87 In order for voters to achieve these
elements of self-governance:
[P]ublic discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information
and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our
agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our
88
governing, they have no power. Over their governing we have sovereign power.

As Justice Douglas also refers to James Madison's statement that:
A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
89
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.

Justice Douglas cautions that there are two principles of First
Amendment doctrine at stake in Branzburg. The first principle:
[I]s that the people, the ultimate governors, must have absolute freedom of, and
therefore privacy of, their individual opinions and beliefs regardless of how suspect
or strange they may appear to others. Ancillary to that principle is the conclusion

85.
86.
1961 SUP.
87.
88.
89.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S 665, 713 (1972).
Id. at 713 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is An Absolute,
CT. REV. 245, 254 (1961)).
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 723.
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that an individual must also have absolute privacy over whatever information he
may generate in the course of testing his opinions and beliefs. 90

The second principle at risk is that "effective self-government
cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust,
unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are
continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination." 91
Thus, as articulated by Justice Douglas, James Madison, and
Alexander Meiklejohn, First Amendment freedom of speech and press
is meant to serve a single basic purpose: self-governance. Two basic
principles are necessary to this purpose: freedom of individual
opinions and beliefs, and the unrestricted flow of opinion and
reporting. Arguably, considering blogging as part of the press fits
nicely into these principles because it advances these necessary
freedoms and serves public governance, as will be further explored
below.
B. Inquiring into a Reporter'sPrivilege for Bloggers
1. Application of Federal Court Cases
It is informative to the inquiry of whether bloggers should be
considered journalists to apply the reasoning of the federal courts in
regards to the current state of traditional reporter's privilege to the
In Branzburg, the Court clearly precluded
context of blogging.
application of First Amendment protections to grand jury testimony
situations. 92 However, while the Court did specify that it was not
holding that "news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment
protection," it did not explain what protections it did qualify for. 93 As
explained above, most lower federal circuit courts do recognize some
form of qualified reporter's privilege, and most of those circuits apply
94
some form of a balancing test.
The test used by the circuits applying a moderately qualified
privilege can be generally summarized as requiring that in order for a
reporter to give up his or her sources, the material sought must be (1)
highly material and relevant to a good faith claim, (2) necessary or
critical to the heart of the claim, and (3) not obtainable from any other

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
See id. at 682-86.
Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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available sources. 95 These circuits will generally apply this test in
most
situations,
including
cases involving
non-confidential
information, but excluding grand jury testimony. 96 The tests utilized
by those circuits recognizing a highly qualified privilege are
essentially the same: in order for a reporter to be required to
surrender confidential information, the information sought must be (1)
highly relevant and sought in good faith, (2) necessary to the proper
presentation of the case, and (3) unavailable from other sources. 97
However, these circuits may not apply the privilege in certain classes
of cases, such as criminal prosecutions or civil contempt trials or to
non-confidential information. 98 Thus, summarizing the reasoning of
these cases allows the inference that there is a reporter's privilege in
the majority of circuits, that the circuits that recognize such a
privilege use essentially the same test, but that the test may be
applied in different situations depending on the level of qualification
or limits the circuit imposes on the privilege. Thus, inquiring into a
reporter's privilege for bloggers is a legitimate examination in the
majority of circuits.
2. Application of State Law Reasoning
Both of the example states, California and New York, recognize
a reporter's privilege that is farther-reaching than any federal
privilege. 99 Both are, at least effectively, absolute privileges that
protect both confidential and non-confidential materials. 10 0 Thus, a

95.
See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.
Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1980)..
96.
Lee v. DOJ, 413 F.3d. 53, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ; New York Times Co. v. Gonzales,
382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Special Proceedings,373 F.3d at 40, 45; Fox
v. Township of Jackson, 64 Fed. Appx. 338, 341 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2003); Schoen v. Schoen, 5
F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1993); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-43 (2d Cir.
1987); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 633
F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir.
1977).
97.
United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980).
98.
Smith, 135 F.3d at 970; In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992).
99.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2; N.Y.C.L.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Miller v. Superior Court of
San Joaquin County, 986 P.2d 170, 174 (Cal. 1999); Delaney v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 789 P.2d 934, 939-40 (Cal. 1990) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2); O'Neill
v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 524 (N.Y. 1988) (citing N.Y.C.L.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8).
100.
Miller, 986 P.2d at 174; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 939 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, §
2); O'Neill, 71 N.Y.2d at 524 (citing N.Y.C.L.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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reporter's privilege for bloggers could potentially be appropriate in a
number of states, as well.
3. Defining Journalism
Defining journalism for the purpose of a reporter's privilege is
no small task. Unfortunately, "[i]n most Western countries, there are
no universal standards for ...the journalism profession - no required

degrees,
no
entrance
exam, no
mandatory
organizational
membership." 10 1 This lack of formality for the profession is based on
the "fundamental" idea that "no one should have to obtain a license to
speak." 10 2 Although:
[M]any working journalists have a current or prior association with an established
news gathering organization, there are countless persons who work either alone or
tangentially with an established news gathering
organization as stringers 103 ,
10 4
bloggers.
and
authors,
independent
freelancers,

a. An Example of the Difficulty and Inconsistency in Defining
Journalism- The Citizen JournalistReports and the Drudge Report

It is much easier to draw a parallel between a traditional
journalist, such as a reporter for the New York Times or a
correspondent for a local news station, or Joel Achenbach, who writes
the Achenblog for Washingtonpost.com. 105 But, what about the
Citizen Journalists Report on msnbc.msn.com? MSNBC is a wellrespected and established news gathering organization. But do the
"Citizen Journalists" who take assignments from "The Assignment
Desk" on the website and post their own reports on topics such as
"Rebuilding homes and lives" and "Returning home" after Hurricane
10 6
Katrina attain the status of bona fide reporters?

101.
Anatasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist's Testimonial Privilege in the
InternationalCriminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 209, 219-20 (2005).
102.
Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist'sPrivilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1407 (2003)
103.
"A stringer is a person who acts as a professional information-source for a
reporter. Freelancers are journalists who sell their work on a project basis and who are not
permanently associated with a news organization." Heeger, supra note 101, at 220 n.31.
104.
Id. at 220.
105.
See Joel Achenbach, Achenblog, WashingtonPost.com (Jan. 17, 2005),
http:/blogs.washingtonpost.com/achenblog/2005/01/about the achen.html.
106.
See Citizen Journalists Report, MSNBC.com, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6639760/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2006). A section on the webpage labeled "The Assignment Desk" asks
"Do you have a Citizen Journalist report?" and lists several assignments with links to
email a story to MSNBC.com, inviting bloggers to send text, pictures, and videos. See id.
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It is arguable that the bloggers for MoJo Blog and the
Achenblog, who are employees of Mother Jones and The Washington
Post, respectively, would be considered true journalists simply because
of their affiliation
"with an established
news gathering
organization," 107 but it would be much more difficult to make an
argument that the Citizen Journalists on MSNBC should be
considered journalists because these people may be one-time reporters
who have no employment contract for their work. Is there any reason
why this should be the case? Are there any fundamental differences
between the information provided by these 'official' and 'unofficial'
journalists besides the nature of their relationship with the news
organization publishing their material?
Upon closer comparison of the blogs on MoJo Blog, Achenblog,
and the Citizen Journalists Report, one may discover a difference in
writing quality, detail, and use of statistical facts. Additionally, each
blog entry on the Citizens Journalists Report is prefaced with a short
explanation by the editor giving the blogger's name, location, and
purpose of the entry, as well as the submission date. 0 8 The status of
the bloggers on the Citizens Journalists Report become even less clear
considering that their articles become property of MSNBC.com and
that they may be edited by MSNBC.com. 10 9 Does the fact that the
Citizen Journalist bloggers take 'assignments' from the MSNBC.com
website, that their entry may be edited and becomes sublicensed to
the website give the bloggers and their posted material an adequate
relationship to an established newsgathering organization in order to
make them journalists?
The Citizen Journalists Report illustrates the difficulty of
developing a working definition of journalism and journalists.
Journalism is "a loosely-defined profession" and defining it should

107.
Heeger, supra note 101, at 220.
108.
See Gena McCown, Citizen Journalists Report:
CJ: Far From Normal in
Wilma's Aftermath, MSNBC.com, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9776189/ (last updated Oct. 28,
2005) ("Editor's note: Gena McCown of Boynton Beach, Fla., describes the aftermath of
Hurricane Wilma on her community, which is 55 miles north of Miami. This essay was
submitted Thursday, Oct. 27.").
109.
Under each entry on the Citizens Journalist Report, the site states:
For materials you post or otherwise provide to MSNBC (a "Submission"),
you grant MSNBC permission to (1) use, copy, distribute, transmit, publicly
display, publicly perform, reproduce, edit, modify, translate and reformat your
Submission, each in connection with the MSNBC Web Site, and (2) sublicense
these rights, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. MSNBC will
not pay you for your Submission. MSNBC may remove your Submission at any
time. For each Submission, you represent that you have all rights necessary for
you to make the grants in this section.

BLOGGERS AS REPORTERS

2006]

achieve "a balance between covering all those who could and should
benefit from [a journalist's] privilege, while at the same time
excluding those who would seek to wrap themselves in the privilege
simply to avoid their duty to testify [about their sources] ."1
A case involving Matt Drudge, who was sued by plaintiffs for
publishing "defamatory material about them on his web site, the
'Drudge Report,' " also further illustrates the uncertain state of the
legal definition of journalism." In that case, the plaintiffs "moved to
compel [Drudge] to respond to a number of their interrogatories and
document requests" in an effort to obtain Drudge's sources of
information about the plaintiffs. 112 Drudge invoked, among other
defenses, the protection of the reporter's privilege under both the
California and U.S. constitutions. 1 3 In determining whether to grant
Drudge these protections, the court did not address the question of
whether Drudge was actually a journalist for the purposes of this
privilege despite the fact that Drudge's website is not affiliated with
any established news gathering organization. 114 Rather, the court's
focus was directly on the inquiry as to whether the protections of the
First Amendment had been overcome, holding that the "plaintiffs
[had] proffered nothing to satisfy their burden [that they had
exhausted every reasonable source of information]" and ruling that
"the Court cannot find that the First Amendment's protections have
1 15
been outweighed absent such a showing."
b. What Should Courts Make of This Difficulty and Ambiguity?
Journalism has been described as existing on a continuum,
with "individuals who gather news, which is then vetted by editors
and disseminated through an established news outlet (newspaper,
internet, television, or radio), which may be either independent (such
as the New York Times of CNN) or government-funded (such as the
British and Canadian Broadcasting Companies)" at one end of the

110.
111.
112.

Heeger, supra note 101, at 220.
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D 236, 239 (D.D.C. 1999).
Id. at 238.

113.

Id.

114.
Blumenthal, 186 F.R.D. at 244. At the time of the case, Drudge's sole source of
income was a contract with AOL whereby AOL paid Drudge $3,000 per month "to carry his
reports, and retained the right to remove, or direct [Drudge] to remove, any content which,
as reasonably determined by AOL . . . [violated] AOL's then-standard Terms of Service."
James P. Jenal, When Is a User Not a "User"? Finding the Proper Role for Republication
Liability on the Internet, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 453, 465 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
115.
Blumenthal, 186 F.R.D. at 244. The court found no reason to address the claim
under California law.
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spectrum. 116 These are bona fide, undeniable journalists because they
"must adhere to [their] organizations' codified standards of news
reporting conduct and subject their work to the scrutiny of editors,"
and because "[u]ltimately, the work of these journalists, editors, and
executives is inextricably intertwined with the reputation of the news
organization for which they are associated and, in turn, a news
organization builds on the collective works of its employees to gather
access and influence. 1 17
On the "opposite end of this spectrum are individuals who work
as sole practitioners, either as stringers or freelancers who collect and
produce reportage, commentary, or analysis to be sold to media
organizations or to be used in a non-traditional news outlet or
book."11 8 Heeger expresses concern that "there really is nothing to
stop the individual who writes an article and posts it on the Internet.
• . from calling himself or herself a journalist. A journalist working
alone does not necessarily benefit from the safety net of established
standards and editors to enforce these standards."1 1 9 However, should
a lack of 'a safety net' be the primary concern in granting privilege to
an individual? Or, should the focus be on the newsworthiness of the
work produced? If no one should have to have a license to speak,
should one be required to have a 'safety net' in order to be considered a
journalist?' 20 Perhaps this stance boils down to elitism in the form of
bias against any 'so-called' journalist who operates outside the largescale news institutions.
Blumenthal v. Drudge may shed some light on these
questions. 121 Although the court did not elucidate its reasons for not
addressing the question of whether Drudge was a journalist in that
case, one may assume that the court had some reason for assuming
that he was, or it would make no sense that it applied the reporter's
privilege to his source information. Thus, it seems that some bloggers
could be afforded constitutional protections despite a lack of affiliation
with an established news gathering organization.
This case is
especially poignant considering that the Drudge Report is not
affiliated with any major news organization, and that its content
varies from critiques on Britney Spears' fashion choices1 22 to Samuel
116.

Heeger, supra note 101, at 221.

117.

Id. at 221-22.

118.

Id. at 222.

119.

Id.

120.
One could argue that the blogger's reputation is safety net enough.
121.See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 244 (D.D.C. 1999).
122.
See Gina Serne, Britney Bottoms Out with Blackwell, Eonline (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,18120,00.html?rsslatest.
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Alito's confirmation hearings, 123 and that Matt Drudge has been
referred to as a mere "gossip columnist" 124 and the Drudge Report has
been likened to a "[garbage] dump" 125 and a "scandal sheet. ' 126 If a
court considered Drudge to be a journalist amidst this variety of
reporting and criticism, perhaps the definition of journalism is much
127
broader than it appears.
C. Developing a Working Approach to Applying FirstAmendment
Jurisprudenceto Blogging
1. Institutional Approach to First Amendment Jurisprudence
Some scholars believe that current First Amendment doctrine
does not differentiate sufficiently between categories of speakers specifically the press and the non-press speakers. 128 Professor
Schauer believes that the "First Amendment does not protect all
speech, or even most speech, but the speech that it does protect is
protected as speech, with relatively little regard for the identity of the
speaker or of the institutional environment in which the speech
occurs." 129 Stated differently, "existing First Amendment doctrine
renders the Press Clause redundant and thus irrelevant, with the
institutional press being treated simply as another speaker." 130
However, this viewpoint seems to overlook the numerous state shield
laws referenced above, as well as federal and state court cases
providing for a reporter's privilege that is not applied to private, nonpress citizens' speech. 131 Professor Schauer seems to rely on an
expansive reading of Branzburg when he states that the Supreme
123.
See Jesse J. Holland, Democrats Say Alito's Answers Inconsistent, myway (Jan.
11, 2006), http://apnews.myway.com/article/20060111/D8F2IGHG4.html.
124.
Matt Richtel, From the Drudge Report to the Drudge Retort, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1998, at G3.
125.
Joke of the Day, SLATE, Sept. 17, 1999.
126.
Jenal, supra note 114, at 465.
127.
Additionally, it is important to note that at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention, press credentials were issued to thirty-six bloggers, thus showing the trend of
considering bloggers to be legitimate reporters. David D. Caron & Megan A. Fairlie, Eds.,
International Decision: Evidentiary Privilege of JournalistsReporting in Areas of Armed
Conflict-Evidence in War Crimes Trials-Rule-MakingProcess of ICTY, 98 A.J.I.L. 805, 809
n.32 (2004).
128.
See Frederick Schauer, The Faegre & Benson Symposium: Law, Information
and Freedom of Expression: Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256 (2005).
129.
Id. at 1256.
130.
Id. at 1257.
131.
See discussion infra Parts I.B.1., I.B.2.
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Court "[refused] to create a constitutional privilege for journalists
'
asked to identify their sources. "132
In response to this supposed lack of
differentiation between speakers, Professor Schauer advocates an
Institutional Account of the First Amendment. 133 This account relies
on the following inquiry:
We first locate some value that the First Amendment treats, or
should treat, as particularly important. Then we investigate whether
that value is situated significantly within and thus disproportionately
served by some existing social institution whose identity and
boundaries are at least moderately identifiable. If so, then we might
develop a kind of second-order test. If there is a reporter's privilege,
for example, we might ask not whether this exercise of the privilege
serves primary First Amendment purposes, but instead simply
whether the person claiming the privilege is a reporter. Obviously,
defining the category of people who receive the privilege will be based
both on the reasons for having the privilege and the reasons for
locating it in a particular institution, but the case-by-case inquiry will
largely consist of applying the rule, rather than applying the reasons
134
lying behind the rule directly to individual cases.
This suggested inquiry simply does not' follow a sensible order.
Rather than asking at the outset whether the speech at issue should
be protected and/or privileged because it serves First Amendment
purposes, Schauer's inquiry appears to proceed in the following way.
Faced with a First Amendment privilege question, a court would ask
what the values protected by the First Amendment are, and whether
certain social institutions, like the press, serve those values. Then,
the court would ask "simply whether the person claiming the privilege
was a reporter," and the court would make this determination by
applying a pre-established rule based on "the reasons for having the
' 135
privilege and the reasons for locating it in a particular institution."
However, given that the very text of the First Amendment places the
privilege in "the press," it seems redundant to examine the reasons
why the privilege is located in the press at every trial involving
reporter's privilege. That may be a stimulating intellectual exercise,
but it is not helpful to this particular inquiry in its practical context.
The real question comes back to determining who is the press, and the
case-by-case inquiry involves both "defining the category of people who
receive the privilege" and "applying the reasons behind the rule
132.
Schauer, supra note 128, at 1262. However, as delineated above, many courts
have not read Branzburg as completely fatal to any form of reporter's privilege.
133.
See id. at 1273.
134.
Id. at 1275.

135.

Id.
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directly to individual cases" to determine whether the person seeking
to invoke the privilege should receive it.136 Otherwise, the court is
stuck in a redundant and rigid inquiry in every case.
In advocating for an institutional account that involves courts
defining the institutions involved, Professor Schauer simultaneously
points out the difficulties that courts have in "understanding nonlegal
institutions, describing them, and then designing doctrine around
them" and following their "special mission of stability for stability's
sake" while responding "to changing institutions and changing
technology."'13 7 The answer to this predicament seems to be exactly
what Professor Schauer is trying to avoid, a case by case inquiry on
the purposes of the First Amendment privilege for the press in
determining whether the person or group seeking to invoke the
privilege is a member of the press. This keeps the court within the
realm of the legal institution of the First Amendment while avoiding
an inquiry into the non-legal institutions of "the Internet and other
aspects of modern communication."' 38 This encourages a clear, stable,
but not fixed, rule focused on First Amendment purposes and
priorities rather than the details of the workings of specific
institutions.
David D. Smyth's proposition adds to this idea. His article
examines blogging in the context of "the traditional split of First
Amendment treatment of the media on one hand and ordinary trial
participants on the other" when speaking and publishing news about
criminal cases.1 39 Smyth states:
News media have traditionally been accorded greater First Amendment protection
with respect to reporting on judicial events than other speakers receive. Now,
because a witness's speech about a trial can easily take the form of a website post,
the distinction between press and citizen-witness becomes much less significant,
and the courts have less justification for granting lower protection to ordinary
140
speakers than they do to the media.

Smyth also states that, at least in the context of press coverage of
public trials, the changing face of the press will require that "[iinstead
of excluding traditional media along with bloggers, the courts will
have to include bloggers along with the conventional press to bring
them under the same tent."14 1 Thus, rather than lowering the access

136.
Id.
137.
Id. at 1266.
138.
Id.
139.
David D. Smyth, A New Framework for Analyzing Gag Orders Against Trial
Witnesses, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 89, 94 (2004).
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 125.
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and protections afforded to traditional media, Smyth suggests raising
the status of bloggers up to that of the traditional media to put all who
speak as the press in the same category.
2. Democracy-Focused Approach to First Amendment Jurisprudence
a. Speech is More than Speech as Such
In the context of government regulation that interferes with
speech, Professor Post suggests that the Court's attempts to
"formulate general principles for the constitutional protection of
'speech as such'" is the common cause of the Court's First Amendment
doctrinal failures. 142 This is because " 'speech as such' has no
constitutional value .

.

.

.

Constitutional value inheres instead in

specific forms of social order, and... speech has tended to receive the
constitutional protection necessary for it to facilitate the maintenance
and success of specific forms of social order." 143 In response to what he
sees as the Court's faulty analysis, Post's theory directs the Court to
"decide First Amendment cases by authorizing particular social
practices. For this purpose[,] rights ought not to be regarded as the
private attachments of persons or entities, but rather as the
instruments by which the law locates, defines, and sustains desirable
144
social practices."
This theory applies easily to blogging. Arguably, one can view
blogging as a desirable social practice because it allows for wide
dissemination of information relatively cheaply and quickly, it often
invites comment and interaction, and it allows anyone with access to
the internet to become part of the press. Thus, the Court could
consider blogging to be a desirable social practice for First
Amendment purposes, and, following Professor Post's proposed
doctrinal approach, it would extend First Amendment rights and
protections to bloggers in order to sustain the practice of blogging.
However, this is not an entirely workable inquiry, as it requires courts
to determine which social practices should be authorized and valued.
As previously discussed, it is difficult for courts to define certain social
institutions, let alone determine which institutions should be valued
over others.

142.
Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1279 (1995).
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
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b. Distinguishingthe Internet from Other Media
An important distinction between traditional forms of media,
or "traditional mass media," and the Internet is that "Internet
technology presents the opportunity for individuals to participate
actively in the exchange of information through two-way
communication. The Internet is a global forum, facilitating open
dialogue on important issues." 145 Another significant difference is that
146
the Internet has "[miore diverse ownership" than traditional media.
For less than twenty dollars per year plus the cost of an internet
connection, an individual can own and maintain a website, but owning
a television station or a newspaper is obviously much more expensive
and complicated. 147 This difference "increases the possibility that
some content will address the interests of [minority and lower income
groups] and represent the makeup of American society more
accurately" than traditional media. 148 This reinforces the idea that
the Internet and blogging can serve to enhance our democracy through
dissemination of information from diverse sources that is accessible to
diverse readers. This also supports the idea that bloggers should be
protected by the same privileges of traditional journalists because
they contribute to our democratic society by making information
obtainable on a wide scale no less, if not more so than traditional
journalists.
In contrast, Professor Berger, in quoting from the Hutchins
Commission Four Theories of the Press, states that "because of a
growing monopoly power [of the press], the press must hold freedom of
the press in trust for the entire population."' 149 However, blogging has
the potential to reduce this monopoly power by injecting individuals
into the institution of the press.

145.
Erica Hepp, Note, Barking Up the Wrong Channel: An Analysis of
Communication Law Problems Through the Lens of Media ConcentrationRules, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 553, 584 (2005).

146.
Id. at 587.
147.
Yahoo's standard webhosting service is $19.95 per year. Plan Comparison
Chart, Yahoo! Small Business, http://sbs.smallbusiness.yahoo.com/webhosting/compare.php
(last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
148.
Hepp, supra note 145, at 587.
149.
Berger, supra note 102, at 1403 (quoting FREDERICK SEATON SIEBERT et al.,
FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS (1963) (the four theories are authoritarian, libertarian,

social responsibility, and Soviet communism)) (internal quotations omitted).
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3. Process-Based Approach
Professor Berger focuses on language in state shield statutes
under which "the protected journalist usually must meet two
requirements: (1) he or she must have a substantial connection with or
relationship to a recognized or traditional news media entity, and (2)
he or she must be engaged in recognized or traditional news media
activities." 150 Berger extends this reasoning to determine that
bloggers in particular should benefit from First Amendment
protections when they "[behave] as press,"'15 1 which "includes engaging
in an aggressive newsgathering process." 152 This process "directly
serves important First Amendment purposes: gaining and sharing
information about the government, as well as informing the public
about a range of matters important to their lives."'153 Additionally,
"[w]hat distinguishes the protected press from other, unprotected,
information businesses is the use of editorial judgment - the
'independent choice of information and opinion of current value,
directed to public need, and borne of non-self-interested purposes.' "154
The proposition that First Amendment protection should be
based on the 'aggressive newsgathering process' seems fundamentally
flawed. Arguably, a blogger's act of posting her blog for the world to
see would fall under press behavior, as making information available
for public dissemination is an inherent part of the press. 155 But,
concepts such as "aggressive newsgathering," "current value," public
need" and "non-self-interested purposes" seem too broad to be
15 6
workable.
These concepts are too vague in the sense that defining them in
a way that a court can apply them consistently and efficiently would
be a daunting task. Would a reporter for the New York Times who
received a call from a government sources leaking a secret, attempts
to verify the information provided, and then writes an article using
the source's information have engaged in aggressive newsgathering?
What about an independent blogger in the same situation? Must the
writer seek out a source in order to be sufficiently aggressive? Is fact
checking sufficient aggression, or is something more required? What
150.
Id. at 1393.
151.
Id. at 1396.
152.
Id. at 1400.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 1399 (quoting Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The
Tension Between Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY
L.J. 895, 856 (1998)).
155.
Berger, supra note 102, at 1403.
156.
Id. at 1399-1400.
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more could be required? Who determines the current value of or
public need for information? Is a judge equipped to assess these
concepts in a given case? Would a judge have to make such a
determination on a case-by-case basis? Non-self-interested purposes
seem to present an even more problematic analysis. In some ways,
independent bloggers who are not paid for their efforts are less selfinterested than reporters who are paid for their work by major
newspapers or television stations. In short, basing access to First
Amendment protections on the ill-defined "process" of journalism
opens more doors in the judicial inquiry than it closes.
Professor Berger cites "[t]he most comprehensive current effort
by working journalists to define journalism" as the three-year study
conducted by the Committee of Concerned Journalists. 15 7 This study
yielded a publication that listed nine general elements that comprise
journalism:
(1) journalistic truth, (2) a first loyalty to citizens, (3) discipline of verification, (4)
independence from subject matter, (5) independent monitoring of power, (6)
providing a forum for public criticism and compromise, (7) making the significant
and proportionality of the news,
interesting and relevant, (8) comprehensiveness
158
and (9) exercise of personal conscience.

While these elements are useful in formulating a code of ethics
for the profession of journalism, they should not preclude an
individual who is widely disseminating information on the Internet
independently from seeking and obtaining the protections of the First
Amendment as a member of the press. Perhaps the press, for First
Amendment purposes, should be viewed independently from the
profession of journalism.
Professor Berger's basic premise is that the inquiry of who is a
journalist should focus on intent to engage in journalism. 15 9 She
states that "[a]n individual is engaged in journalism when he or she is
involved in a process that is intended to generate and disseminate
truthful information to the public on a regular basis." 160 On its face,
However,
this proposition makes sense and seems appropriate.
Berger further identifies two elements of the newsgathering process:
"the reporter's . . . record of publication" and "the availability of
information form which readers can judge the . . . reporter's

157.
158.

Id. at 1404.
Id. (quoting BILL KovACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALIST:

WHAT NEWSPEOPLE SHOULD KNOW AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT 12-13 (Three Rivers

Press 2001)).
159.
Berger, supra note 102, at 1411.
160.
Id.
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independence."'161 The first (and more problematic) element requires
evidence of "a [t]rack [r]ecord of [g]athering and [p]ublicly
[d]isseminating [u]sually [tlruthful [i]nformation."' 6 2 Professor Berger
states that:
[I]f the reporter . . . intends to publish only once, there is no real need for shield
law protection. The law's purpose is to protect the free flow of information; that
flow is not diminished if a reporter
is forced to testify about the information
16 3
obtained in order to report one story.

But it seems that the free flow of information would be greatly
chilled by the requirement of a track record. Sources of confidential
information would be forced to research various reporters to find one
with a substantial track record so that the source would be assured of
protection. The self-governance purpose of freedom of the press does
not seem to contemplate a requirement that only those with track
records of publication are entitled to its protections. Self-governance
should encourage even one-time publication if it furthers the free flow
of information in general, if not a frequent "flow" through the
individual publishing only one time.
In addition to a track record, Professor Berger states that
"some evidence of intent to disseminate information to a public
audience is necessary to fulfill journalism's role of providing
information necessary for self-governance."' 164 Again, intent does not
seem to be contemplated by or necessary to self-governance. To truly
serve this value, information need only have the effect of serving selfgovernance. Although intent to do so would clearly make serving selfgovernance more direct and straightforward, one can conceivably
advance self-governance unintentionally by, for example, posting an
blog entry that the blogger thinks is merely interesting about a public
official that turns out to influence an election. Berger specifies that
intent can be shown through "[e]vidence of past publication to a
broader audience" or dissemination "to at least a portion of some
1 65
public audience.'
Again, past publication seems unnecessary to serving selfgovernance. Additionally, although it would clearly better serve selfgovernance to disseminate information to a wide audience, it is not
necessary to self-governance that this occur. A college student may
potentially serve self-governance by posting a blog read by only her
friends that raises their awareness about an issue or event on campus,
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1411-12.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1413.

164.

Id.

165.

Id. at 1414.

BLOGGERS AS REPORTERS

2006]

even though the information is "disseminated to only a few, or to only
a private audience." 166 Similarly, a concerned citizen may hand out
pamphlets to her friends and colleagues about an issue in her town,
and this may serve self-governance even though she has no intent to
reach a broader audience. These examples may not be the norm, or
even frequent occurrences, but that does not mean that they should be
categorically precluded from statutory and constitutional press
protection.
III. SOLUTION: AN EFFECT-BASED APPROACH
Professor Berger makes the point that "[b]oth constitutional
and statutory shield laws are designed to protect the gathering and
dissemination of the kind of information that is of value to a public
that must make intelligent decisions to govern itself."167 This relates
to the proposed solution in this note, an effect-based approach to
determining whether bloggers are subject to a reporter's privilege.
However, unlike Berger, this solution finds unnecessary a track record
of publication or intent to affect the political process. Rather, the
inquiry should focus on whether the information at issue is "of value
168
to a public that must make intelligent decisions to govern itself."
Regardless of the medium through which information is disseminated,
or the process or intent behind its production and dissemination, if
information enhances freedom of individual opinions and beliefs and
contributes to the free flow of opinion and reporting, it should be
protected. Thus, some bloggers will be protected, but not all will. But
this should not depend on how many blogs the individual has posted
or who reads them. If the first blog posted by an individual is read by
one person, but contributes to self-governance, this should be enough
to for the blogger to be protected.
In making this inquiry, courts could focus on the purpose of the
reporter's privilege under the First Amendment and the shield laws that of self-governance - and the two principles that serve it: freedom
of opinion and belief, and unrestricted flow of opinion and reporting.
This inquiry could potentially be expansive, time consuming, and
overwhelming for courts. However, in focusing on the effect of the
information, the court can narrow the inquiry to who the information
reached, how the information was used, and how the information
contributed the freedom and flow of opinion.

166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 1409-10.
Id. at 1410.
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An example may make this more clear. If a blogger posts a
statement made by a local official, leaked to him by a confidential
source, and a few residents of his city read the blog, and then vote
against that official in the next election, it is relatively clear that selfgovernance has been served by the freedom of belief and the flow of
reporting. Thus, if this blogger was brought into court by a subpoena
for information about his source, a court should apply the reporter's
privilege to this blogger so that he would not have to disclose
confidential information about his source, as doing so may chill such
flow of information in the future and thus impede self-governance.
This is an "easy" case, however, and other cases may be much more
difficult. But, this is a workable starting place for courts to apply the
reporter's privilege more evenhandedly across mediums.
IV. CONCLUSION

A more inclusive, effect-based approach to applying the
reporter's privilege serves self-governance more effectively than other
proposed approaches, and it means that the privilege will more often
apply to bloggers. This method allows courts to focus on the speech
itself and the purpose of the First Amendment, rather than on a
specific institution, the process behind the speech, or the tenants of
the profession of journalism. Although bloggers as a per se rule will
not be included under this approach, traditional media will not always
be included either. A blogger posting about his date the night before
should not be protected, just as a horoscope columnist in a major
newspaper should probably not be protected. This approach does not
yield a clear-cut, universally applicable bright line rule, but it does
provide guidance to courts for a serious, thoughtful inquiry into
whether a blogger is contributing to self-governance through
promotion of freedom of opinion and belief and unrestricted flow of
reporting and opinion.
In this new age of high-speed, wide
information dissemination, and availability, blogging may in fact
provide the best means for achieving these ends.
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